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Abstract: 
In  this  paper  we  examine  the  influence  of  minority  expropriation  on  disclosure  level  in  France  where 
shareholders are poorly protected and the main agency problem is the one between controlling and minority 
shareholders (type II conflict) while prior studies have been undertaken in the United States, in a context of 
ownership  dispersion  and  high  investor  protection  where  the  main  agency  conflict  opposes  managers  to 
shareholders (type I conflict). 
Using a sample of 81 French firms on the 2001-2004 period, we find a negative relation between disclosure level 
and both ownership and control concentration and double voting rights shares. These results confirm that type II 
conflict exacerbates the disclosure problem. Controlling shareholders benefit from superior information which 
helps them to profit from private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders particularly when they hold 
voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights; therefore they are likely to reduce disclosure.  
Our results show also a positive relation between disclosure level and family control which is similar to Ali, 
Chen et Radhakrishnan (2007) findings on American firms. 
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Résumé 
Ce papier examine l’influence de l’expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires sur le niveau de divulgation en 
France  où  les  investisseurs  sont  faiblement  protégés  et  le  conflit  d’agence  principal  est  celui  opposant  les 
actionnaires de contrôle aux actionnaires minoritaires (conflit d’agence de type II). Cependant, la plupart des 
études  précédentes  ont  été  menées  aux  Etats-Unis  où  l’environnement  légal  offre  aux  investisseurs  une 
protection  élevée  et  la  propriété  est  dispersée  d’où  l’intérêt  au  conflit  d’agence  traditionnel  opposant  les 
actionnaires aux managers (conflit d’agence de type I). 
A partir d’un échantillon de 81 entreprises françaises sur la période 2001-2004, nous trouvons une relation 
négative entre le niveau de divulgation et la concentration du capital et du contrôle et l’existence de droit de vote 
double. Ces résultats confirment que le conflit d’agence de type II accentue le problème de divulgation. Les 
actionnaires de contrôle bénéficient d’un avantage informationnel comparés aux actionnaires minoritaires leur 
permettant de profiter des bénéfices privés du contrôle au détriment des actionnaires minoritaires, ils réduisent le 
niveau de divulgation afin d’éviter la contestation des actionnaires minoritaires. Le risque d’expropriation est 
d’autant plus élevé lorsque les actionnaires de contrôle disposent de droits de vote en excès par rapport à leurs 
droits  de  capital  ce  qui  les  pousse  à  réduire  le  niveau  de  divulgation.  Concernant,  l’influence  du  contrôle 
familial, nos résultats sont similaires à ceux trouvés par Ali, Chen et Radhakrishnan (2007) sur des données 
américaines à savoir : il existe une relation positive entre le niveau de divulgation et le contrôle familial.  
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1. Introduction   
Corporate  governance  has  been  criticized  following  the  financial  crisis  of  2001  due  to 
financial scandals (Enron, WorldCom…) that shed light on the importance of the corporate 
governance issue. Manipulation of accounting numbers and disclosure of false information in 
Enron showed that minority shareholders rights are not always protected. The main contests 
that Enron’ shareholders have signaled are non disclosure of relevant information, delaying 
reporting losses, and disclosure of false information. These bankruptcies lead legal authorities 
to develop new regulations in order to improve shareholders information, for example the 
Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  (SOX)  in  the  USA,  the  directive  2004/109/CE  of  the  European 
Parliament and Council called “transparency directive”, and the LSF act in France. Those 
scandals  proved  that  shareholders  are  not  homogenous.  In  opposition  to  individual 
shareholders  who hold limited resources to obtain information about the firm, controlling 
shareholders often participate in the firms’ management, and therefore they can obtain private 
information  which  gives  them  opportunities  to  expropriate  minority  shareholders;  this 
situation  leads  to  an  agency  conflict  opposing  controlling  shareholders  to  non-controlling 
shareholders (type II conflict). However, previous studies have focused on the agency conflict 
between managers and shareholders (type I conflict) (Fama et Jensen, 1983). Nevertheless 
recent studies have shown the prevalence of ownership concentration and the validity of the 
agency  conflict  between  controlling  shareholders  and  minority  shareholders  (Shleifer  et 
Vishny, 1997 ; La Porta et al., 1998 ; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances et Shleifer, 1999 ; La Porta 
et al., 2000 ; Faccio et Lang, 2002). 
Controlling shareholders have incentives to exploit private benefit at the expense of minority 
shareholders interest. Because of their proximity to operating activity, they can obtain private 
information  to  evaluate  their  investment  return  and  are  therefore  reluctant  to  disclose 
information to public in order to avoid minority contest and continue to expropriate other 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders usually have voting rights in excess of their cash flow 
rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances et Shleifer, 1999); consequently they don’t support all the 
consequences of their decisions. The separation between ownership and control exacerbate 
the minority expropriation risk. Family shareholders participate actively in the management; 
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This paper examines the impact of minority expropriation on the disclosure level of French 
firms. In particular, we study the effect of factors that influence minority expropriation which 
deals with ownership and control concentration (Gelb, 2000 ; Fan et Wong, 2002 ; Labelle et 
Schatt, 2005), the separation between cash flow and voting rights (Grossman et Hart, 1988 ; 
Harris et Raviv, 1988), and family ownership (Chau et Gray, 2002).  
We analyze a sample of 81 French firms over the 2001-2004 period. We measure disclosure 
quality using an indirect measure: analyst earning forecast dispersion and find a negative 
relation between disclosure level and both ownership and control concentration. First, we 
conclude that under high ownership concentration, controlling shareholders are less reliant on 
minority shareholders and are likely to expropriate benefits from them; therefore they have 
less  incentive  to  disclose  information.  Second,  when  the  controlling  shareholder  has  high 
voting  percentage,  the  entrenchment  effect  is  exacerbated  because  he  doesn’t  need  the 
complicity of other shareholders to increase the chance of approval of one decision submitted 
to the general meeting. 
The results show also a negative relation between the existence of double voting rights shares 
and disclosure level. When controlling shareholders hold cash flow rights in excess of their 
control rights, they do not support all the consequences of their decisions which increase their 
incentives to expropriate minority shareholders. Therefore, they also have little incentive to 
disclose information to protect themselves. 
We find that family controlled firms present better disclosure level than non family firms. 
This result is similar with Ali et al. (2007) findings that family firms report better quality 
earnings and are more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news. Because of the non 
separation  between  management  and  ownership,  family  firms  face  more  severe  type  II 
conflict  and  less  severe  type  I  conflict.  Our  results  are  consistent  with  the  view  that  the 
decrease in type I conflict exceed the increase in type II conflict which posits that family 
firms are likely to present better disclosure quality. 
We extend prior studies of voluntary disclosure in four ways. First, our paper adds to the 
growing  literature  on  the  conflict  of  controlling  shareholders  with  minority  shareholders.  
Most  of  the  studies  that  examine  disclosure  have  been  conducted  in  USA  or  UK  where 
individual shareholders are protected which result in ownership dispersion and focus on the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders. Our study extends previous research by 
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(La Porta et al., 2000) leading to ownership concentration and the raise of an agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders because of lower law enforcement to protect 
minority rights. 
Second,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge  this  is  the  first  study  that  examines  minority 
expropriation in France. French firms have the possibilities to separate between voting rights 
and cash flow rights through pyramids, double voting rights shares and crossholding. Due to 
this complicated ownership structures, controlling have the opportunity to hold more control 
than their equity ownership indicates, which further amplify the entrenchment effect. 
Third,  we  study  the  identity  of  shareholders.  Most prior  studies  (Gelb,  2000  ;  Labelle  et 
Schatt, 2005 ; Attig et al., 2006) do not distinguish between family controlled firms and non-
family controlled firms. As suggested before, the intensity of agency conflicts depend on the 
identity of the major shareholders (family/non family) and influence therefore the corporate 
disclosure. The French context is worth to study, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances and Shleifer 
(1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002) find a prevalence of family controlled groups in France..  
Finally, as suggested by Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), understanding why firms invest in 
disclosure is useful not only for preparers and users of accounting information but also for 
regulators.  Firms  with  high  ownership  concentration  are  less  transparent  than  their 
counterparts. Should regulatory authorities impose more disclosure requirements on them? 
Moreover, French firms that want to attract foreign ownership should align their disclosure 
with international standard and offer higher disclosure transparency. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the Literature review 
and hypothesis; section 3 presents the research design and method; section 4 presents the 
results and their interpretations. Finally, we summarize and conclude in section 5. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis 
Our study focus on a new agency conflict that has been less studied in accounting literature 
and arises when ownership is concentrated, it opposes controlling shareholders to minority 
ones. This conflict is more relevant in an environment where investors are less protected such 
in civil law country like France (La Porta et al., 2000). Our research question deals with the 
way minority expropriation influence corporate disclosure level. We intend to study three 
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(Gelb, 2000 ; Labelle et Schatt, 2005), separation of cash flow and control rights (Grossman 
et Hart, 1988 ; Harris et Raviv, 1988) and family ownership (Chau et Gray, 2002). 
Healy and Palepu (2001) present six forces that affect managers’ disclosure decisions from a 
financial  perspective :  capital  market  transaction,  corporate  control  contests,  stock 
compensation, litigation costs, proprietary costs, and management talent signaling. Disclosure 
studies can be classified into two broad categories. The first presents motivations to disclose 
information (agency costs, capital market transaction, stock compensation, corporate control 
contests  and  management  talent  signaling).  The  second  category  of  studies  examines 
incentives  to  withhold  and  retain  information  (litigation  costs,  proprietary  costs).  Main 
previous studies focus on traditional agency conflicts and argue that firms suffering from high 
agency costs between shareholders and managers are likely to offer high disclosure level. In 
fact, Healy and Palepu (2001) show that demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises 
from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outsiders. Similarly 
to this study and based on agency theory developments, Gelb (2000) finds that disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and contribute therefore 
to reduce agency conflicts.  
Berle and Means (1932) study the dispersion of the capital and the traditional agency problem 
resulting from information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. Recent studies 
show that the validity of the image of the modern corporation drawn by Berle and Means is 
limited particularly in non American firms (Shleifer et Vishny, 1986 ; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silances et Shleifer, 1999 ; Faccio et Lang, 2002). In fact, many studies conducted in other 
developed countries show more significant concentrations of ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silances et Shleifer, 1999 ; Faccio et Lang, 2002) and even among the largest American firms, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find a relative high ownership concentration.  
One of the explanations that La Porta et al. (1999) and Roe (2001) suggest for the prevalence 
of blockholders in continental Europe is that the incapacity of the legal system to protect 
investors  from  potential  manager’s  opportunism  leads  shareholders  to  obtain  large  shares 
blocks to monitor managers themselves. Lee (2004) argue that controlling shareholders can 
easily  control  and  influence  professional  manager  and  that  this  situation  gives  them  the 
possibility  to  manage  the  firm  in  their  interest  and  often  at  the  expense  of  minority 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that when the ownership is concentrated, the main agency 
conflict is between controlling shareholders and minority interest holders rather than between 
shareholders and managers. Johnson et al. (2000) use the term “tunnelling” to refer to “the 
transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder (who is typically also a 
top manager)”(Johnson et al., 2000, p. 3). Controlling shareholders participate to management 
and have incentives to profit from their proximity to operating activities and make decisions 
that  expropriate  minority  shareholders’  wealth,  for  example,  by  paying  excessive 
compensation,  acquiring  perquisites  or  making  investments  that  conflict  with  outsiders’ 
interests.  
Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Biebuyck et al. (2005), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and 
Ho and Wong (2001) notice that agency  costs  in firms where the  capital is hold by  few 
shareholders, are the consequence of interest conflicts between dominant shareholders and 
minority  shareholders.  The  first  have  incentives  to  expropriate  private  benefits  from  the 
second. Moreover, because controlling shareholders hold large blocks of capital and voting 
rights, they can easily constrain managers to follow them. They can therefore have a total 
control  of  the  firm  in particularly  their  disclosure  strategy.  Controlling  shareholders  have 
incentives  to  reduce  information  disclosure  in  order  to  avoid  the  risk  that  minority 
shareholders will be conscious that their interest are in danger and avoid therefore minority 
contests. Consequently, these firms are likely to offer poor disclosure. 
La Porta et al. (1999) find that 75% of controlling shareholders in France are member of the 
management or the board. Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) notice that their position gives them 
the  opportunity  to  obtain  a  free  access  to  a  wide  range  of  information.  This  private 
information help them to make transactions and raise abnormal profit  (Jaffe, 1974 ; Finnerty, 
1976). They are therefore reluctant to disclose information to public in order to protect their 
position. 
Fan and Wong (2002) examine the relation between ownership concentration, measured by 
the  percentage  of  voting  right  of  the  ultimate  shareholder  and  the  quality  of  accounting 
information as measured by earning informativeness using a sample of 977 companies in 
seven East Asian economies. The authors argue that concentrated ownership create agency 
conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors leading controlling shareholders to 
report accounting information for self-interested purposes, which result in less credibility in 
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effect  (Morck,  Scheifer  et  Vishny,  1988)  to  explain  the  relation  between  ownership 
concentration and disclosure. They suggest that “as controlling shareholders are entrenched 
by  their  effective  control  of  the  firms,  their  decisions  that  deprive  the  rights  of  minority 
shareholders are often incontestable in the weak legal systems in the region and by ineffective 
corporate governance mechanisms”. Fan and Wong (2002) find that these firms offer poor 
disclosure quality. 
When  controlling  shareholders  hold  large  voting  rights,  they  can  easily  control  the  firm 
because they don’t need the complicity of other shareholders for the approval of their decision 
in  the  general  meeting.  They  can  influence  many  of  the  decision  of  the  firm  notably  it 
disclosure strategy. Consequently, firms with a control concentration are likely to present 
poor disclosure. 
Attig et al.  (2006)  argue that  controlling shareholders have a selfish behavior.  Indeed, to 
increase the chance of executing his plans, the controlling shareholder would limit and delay 
the disclosure of information in order to avoid the intervention of minority shareholders or to 
conduct them to take bad decisions based on inadequate information. 
(Lakhal,  2006)  examine  the  association  between  ownership  concentration  and  voluntary 
disclosure and find that management earnings forecasts are positively associated to ownership 
and control concentration. 
This discussion leads to the following testable hypotheses: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between disclosure level and both ownership and 
control concentration. 
Ben Amar et André (2006) examine the relation between the separation between voting and 
cash flow rights and performance in a Canadian context. They suggest that a large proportion 
of Canadian public companies have controlling  shareholders (families) that often exercise 
control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of the cash flow rights. The authors 
do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact on performance 
arguing that Canada offer good investor protection and that “contrary to other jurisdictions 
offering poor minority shareholder protection or poor corporate governance, separation of 
control and ownership is not viewed as leading to value destroying mergers and acquisitions, 
i.e.,market participants do not perceive families as usingM&A to obtain private benefits at the 








































0  8 
La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) suggest that countries with a civil law system like France present 
low investor protection and higher private benefits of control. One example of low investor 
protection in France is the possibility to separate between voting and cash flow rights which 
allows  one  shareholder  to  control  the  firm  while  possessing  relatively  low  ownership 
percentage. The main mechanism that allows the dissociation between ownership and control 
is settled by the law of 1966 (du code de commerce) that gives French firms the possibility of 
issuing shares with double voting rights when they are registered for at least two years. The 
deviation from “one-share, one-vote” rule increases the risk violating the interest of minority 
shareholders because controlling shareholders have often voting rights in excess of their cash 
flow rights, and don’t support consequently all the consequence of their decision.  
The results of Attig et al. (2006) show that stocks with greater deviations between ultimate 
control and ownership have a larger information asymmetry component of their bid–ask. The 
authors explain this result using the findings of Claessens et al. (2000), they sustain that the 
deviation of control from ownership is associated with more selfish behavior by the ultimate 
shareholder. Following Fan and Wong (2002), the authors suggest that to increase the chance 
of executing theirs plans, controlling shareholders have incentives to minimize and delay the 
disclosure to avoid that other shareholders intervene or to base their decisions on inadequate 
information.  
Fan and Wong (2002) suggest “Moreover, due to the complicated pyramidal and crossholding  
ownership structures typical in East Asian companies, a significant number of controlling 
owners in the region actually possess more  control than their equity ownership indicates, 
which further exacerbates the entrenchment effect”. Controlling shareholders can expropriate 
minority interest benefits and enrich themselves through related party transactions in which 
profits  are  transferred  to  other  companies  they  control.  Consequently  firms  that  separate 
voting rights and cash flow rights are likely to provide poor disclosure level. We thus state the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: there is a negative association between disclosure level and the dissociation between 
voting rights and cash flow rights 
In  France,  family-owned  and  controlled  companies  are  more  in  evidence  than  in  Anglo-
American stock. La Porta et al. (1999) show that 50% of French firms are controlled by 
family  groups.  In  family  controlled  firms,  family  members  actively  participate  to  the 
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information  they  need  to  assess  the  return  of  their  investment.  Moreover,  according  to 
Cormier et al. (2005) “firms with closely-held ownership are not expected to be responsive to 
public investors’ information costs since the dominant shareholders typically have access to 
the information they need”. These families need less external financing, therefore, external 
information demand is low. As dominant shareholders, families have less incentive to disclose 
(Chau et Gray, 2002). Using a sample of 60 listed firms in Singapore and 62 firms listed in 
Hong Kong in 1997, Chau and Gray (2002) test the relation between ownership structure and 
voluntary  disclosure  using  the  Meek  et  al.  index  (1995)  to  measure  disclosure  level. 
Consistent  with  the  information  financing  need  hypothesis,  the  authors  find  a  negative 
relation between family control and voluntary disclosure.  
Ho and Wong (2001) examine the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure quality using a sample of 98 listed firms in Hong Kong where family firms are 
prevalent. The authors find a negative relation between family members in the board and 
voluntary disclosure. They suggest that boards dominated by family members don’t control 
manager to protect the interest of minority shareholders but their role is to vote decisions that 
maximize  the  interest  of  the  family.  Therefore,  these  family  shareholders  can  easily 
expropriate minority shareholders since they have the support of the board to execute their 
plan. We suggest then that minority expropriation risk is higher in family firms then their 
counterparts. Family controlled firm have incentives to limit disclosure in order to continue to 
easily expropriate private benefit.  
Compared to their counterparts,  family  firms  face less severe  agency problem due to the 
separation of ownership and management (type I) but more severe agency problem that arise 
between controlling and minority shareholders (type II) (Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan, 2007). 
The difference between these two agency conflicts determines the direction of the relation 
between family control and disclosure. We suppose that the increase of type II conflict exceed 
the decrease of type I conflict and state the following hypotheses: 
H3: there is a negative association between disclosure level and family ownership 
3. Research design and method 








































0  10 
3.1 The sample 
The sample was selected from French firms listed on the Paris Stock Exchange and part of the 
SBF 120 index in 2004 (120 in total). The first step consists in selecting only industrial and 
commercial firms. We eliminate financial and insurance companies (16 firms) because of 
their  specific  disclosure  requirements  and  financial  characteristics.  Second,  18  companies 
were excluded from the sample because of a lack of data. Finally, we eliminate 3 outliers. The 
final sample is composed of 81 companies, as shown in Table 1. A list of the companies 
included in the sample is reported in the Appendix. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
We selected the period 2001-2004 because of information availability about Analyst earning 
data from IBES historical database.  
3.2 Variables and measurement 
The disclosure quality is a very difficult variable to measure in a French context as there is no 
organization that offers a disclosure rating such as the AIMR/CIC (Association of Investment 
Management Research), and the FAF (Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information 
Committee) in USA.  
Nelson Sofres Institute conducted a survey for AGEFI and Euronext in 2000 to nominate the 
prize of the best annual report and the best investor relations. The first step of this contest is to 
develop a shortlist of SBF120 companies that good annual report/investor relations quality. 
The second step consists of electing the prize for the best annual report/investor relations 
Labelle and Schatt (2005) use this study to measure disclosure quality. However, this measure 
offers a binary proxy which limits the number of methodologies that can be used (LOGIT). 
Many previous studies have developed disclosure index to measure disclosure level or quality 
(Meek,  Roberts  et  Gray,  1995  ;  Botosan,  1997  ;  Michaïlesco,  1999  ;  Depoers,  2000). 
Nevertheless,  this  methodological  approach  has  been  recently  criticized    (Chavent  et  al., 
2006). The authors present three limitations to this approach. First, the disclosure index is 
often determined by summing several items that can be weighted or unweighted. However, 
there  is  no  dominant  practice  and  the  question  of  who  should  weight  the  items  remains 
unanswered. Second, including too many independent variables may create a multicollinearity 
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not always known (Lang et Lundholm, 1993). Chavent et al.(2006) sustain that a ‘classical’ 
linear regression is not always the most suitable tool, and propose the use of a rank regression. 
Following Lang and Lundholm (1996), Barron et al. (1999) examine the relationship between 
analyst earning forecast characteristics and disclosure level. The results of these studies show 
that disclosure level is negatively associated to earning forecast error and earning forecast 
dispersion.  
Dumontier and Maghraoui (2006) argue that “ the information content of accounting numbers 
can’t  be  observe  directly,  they  are  commonly  measured  using  a  proxy  of  information 
asymmetry”. One of the categories used to proxy information asymmetry is based on analyst 
earning forecasts : forecast error (Labelle, Francoeur et Martinez, 2007), forecast dispersion 
(Daley, Senkow et Vigeland, 1988 ; Brown, 1997 ; Barron et al., 1998). We choose analyst 
forecast dispersion to measure disclosure level. Analyst data is taken from the IBES summary 
tape.  
We  include  3  proxies  for  ownership  structure  relying  on  Demsetz  and  Lehn’s  (1985) 
measures. We measure capital concentration by the Herfindhal index, calculated by summing 
the squared percentages of capital held by each shareholder. We also measure the percentage 
of voting rights held by the largest and the second largest shareholder. Bebchuk and Kahan 
(1999) present mechanisms that allow a controlling shareholder to maintain complete control 
of the firm even while he owns a relative low percentage of total shares. Indeed, issuing two 
categories of shares, shares with voting rights and shares without, results in separating voting 
rights and cash flow rights. We use a second ownership concentration variable denoted VOT1 
and VOT2 which take into consideration control and voting rights. We introduce a dummy 
variable  FAM  when  a  firm  is  controlled  by  a  family.  Finally,  we  introduce  four  control 
variables: LNTA, COT, USCOT CAC40 and DEBT. LNTA measures the size of the firm. 
COT is a dummy which equals one if the firm is cross listed and 0 otherwise. USCOT is a 
dummy which equals one if the firm is listed in USA and 0 otherwise CAC40 is a dummy 
which equals one if the firm is included in the CAC40 index and 0 otherwise.  
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
Table 2 summarizes the definitions and measurements of all variables used in this study. Data 








































0  12 
web sites. Earning forecasts are taken from  IBES database. Finally, other accounting and 
financial data were collected from the Compustat database. 
The summary descriptive statistics show that the average percentage of voting rights of the 
major shareholder is 34.9% and the average herfindhal index is 0.14. These high values prove 
that ownership and control are concentrated in French firms. Theses results are coherent with 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances et Shleifer (1999) findings. We find that 45.57% of firms in the 
sample are controlled by families.This result is similar to Faccio et Lang (2002) findings. As 
expected, the descriptive statistics reveal that most of sample firms proceed to a separation 
between voting and cash flow rights (63% of our firms use double voting rights) and the 
average voting rights of the dominant shareholders exceed his cash flow rights of 24%. These 
results proved ownership concentration, the predominance of family controlled firms and the 
separation between ownership and control in France which leads us to examine type II agency 
conflicts (controlling vs minority shareholders). 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
3.3 Method 
We use a panel data regression to examine the effects of the independent variables on the 
disclosure level. 
The regression equation is formulated as follows: 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The  correlation  matrix  show  many  correlations  among  the  variables  introduced  in  the 
regression, we therefore try to avoid putting them together which results in three models M1 
M2 and M3. We discuss hereafter the results of M1, M2 and M3. 
We  test  the  presence  of  specific  effects.  The  chow  test  reveals  the  presence  of  specifics 
effects. We then use the Hausman test (1978) to determine if they are random effects or fixed 
effects. The probability of the test is superior to 10% we can’t then reject the null hypothesis 
H0 and decide to use random effect regression. Our time dimension is limited. Probably our 
result is due to the fact that ownership structure doesn’t move a lot in a short period of 4 
ε + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + =
EPSVAR a USCOT a CAC a LNTA a DEBT a
COT a FAM a DOUBLE a VA a HERFI a VOT a VOT a a DISCL
12 11 10 9 8
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years. We test for the presence of autocorrelation and heterosedaskicity and find that our data 
suffer from the two. We correct it using the command xtgls of STATA. 
We use the opposite of earning forecast dispersion (STD) which is a proxy of information 
asymmetry to measure disclosure level (DISCL). Our independent variable DISCL equals the 
opposite of earning forecast standard deviation (DISCL=- STD that we collect from IBES 
database. 
Table 6 shows the results of the panel regression. Coefficients and Z-statistics are respectively 
reported. First, it is important to notice that the results of the three models M1, M2 and M3 
show a positive and significant relation between STD and HERFI and VOT1. These results 
suggest  a  negative  association  between  disclosure  level  and  ownership  and  control 
concentration.  These  results  confirm  our  first  hypothesis.  Firm  with  high  ownership 
concentration suffer from more minority expropriation then their counterparts. This risk is 
higher when the first shareholders possess high voting rights which allow him to vote decision 
at  the  expense  of  minority  shareholders  without  the  need  to  the  approval  of  other 
shareholders.  One  explanation  of  the  negative  association  between  disclosure  quality  and 
ownership  concentration  is  that  controlling  shareholders  have  possibilities  to  expropriate 
minority shareholders. They have therefore incentive to reduce disclosure level in order to 
exploit private benefits of control and  avoid minority shareholders contest. Consequently, 
entrenched  managers  of  controlled  firms  have  little  incentives  to  provide  high  disclosure 
level. Our results are in accordance with Ho and Wong (2001), Chau and Gray (2002) and 
Eng and Mak (2003). 
Labelle et Schatt (2005) test a non monotonous relation between ownership dispersion and 
disclosure quality suggestion that when insiders (managers and controlling shareholders) hold 
large blocks of capital they use to improve disclosure to get advantage as better liquidity and 
value increase due to disclosure as suggested by (Verrecchia, 1983 ; Welker, 1995).  On the 
contrary, in a case of ownership dispersion, managers improve disclosure to decrease type I 
agency costs (between manager and shareholders). We test this assumption but we find no 
evidence for this relation. 
Second, the regression results show a positive relation between STD and DOUB. Firm issuing 
double  voting  right  offer  low  disclosure  level.  As  we  conjectured  earlier,  the  separation 
between cash flow rights and voting rights amplify the agency problem between controlling 
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excess  of  their  control  rights,  they  have  more  incentives  to  exploit  non-controlling 
shareholders since they may not pay for all the consequences of their decision. Consequently, 
they have incentive to retain information inside the company in order to avoid the intervene of 
non-controlling  shareholders.  However,  we  find  no  significant  association  between  the 
coefficient of separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of the first shareholders 
and disclosure level. This variable presents problem of normality, one possible explanation is 
that our variable is not a good measure of the intensity of the dissociation between voting 
rights and cash flow.  
One explanatory variable related to family ownership is introduced in equation M1, M2 and 
M3.  We  suggest  earlier  that  firms  controlled  by  families  have  little  incentive  to  disclose 
information  to  the  public  for  many  reasons  (Chau  et  Gray,  2002).  First,  the  demand  for 
information  in  such  companies  is  relatively  weak because  the  major providers  of  finance 
already have that information; these families staff many of the senior positions themselves. 
Second, these families are controlling shareholders, they have incentives to retain information 
and expropriate minority shareholders and third these firms suffer from more severe type II 
conflict. 
We find a significant association between disclosure level and family control, nevertheless the 
coefficient sign is opposite to our prediction. Our hypothesis 3, which predicts that family 
control influences negatively disclosure level, is not supported. However this result is similar 
to Ali et al. (2007) findings on a sample of American firms  part off S&P 500. The authors 
argue that “compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe agency problems due 
to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems that arise 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders”. Consequently, the difference in the 
quality of disclosure between family and non-family firms would depend on the difference in 
the severity of their Type I and Type II agency. Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms report 
better quality earnings and are more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news, 
Our  models  include  firm  characteristics  as  control  variables.  We  find  a  positive  and 
significant association between US listing and disclosure level. Firms that are listed on the US 
Stock  Exchange  are  subject  to  several  information  requirements  than  the  French  ones. 
Moreover, the American market is the first financial market and the more active. It requires 
from firms to comply with more mandatory disclosure. American investors are used to high 
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demanding in term of information then the French ones. Our result is in accordance with the 
one found by Labelle and Schatt (2005) and Lakhal (2006). 
We find that lower leverage is related to greater disclosure. Our result is aligned with Eng and 
Mak (2003). These authors suggest that “increased leverage is expected to reduce disclosure 
because leverage helps control the free cash flow problem, and the agency costs of debt are 
controlled  through  restrictive  debt  covenants  in  debt  agreements  rather  than  increased 
disclosure of information in annual reports (Jensen, 1986)”. 
We find that disclosure level is negatively associated to firm size. We explain this relation 
using proprietary cost and litigation cost theory frameworks. Larger firms face more severe 
proprietary costs because of higher competition intensity among them. Consequently, they 
disclose less information to public in order to avoid competitive disadvantage. Our result can 
be also explained using the litigation cost theory development (Francis, Philbrick et Schipper, 
1994).  Healy  et  Palepu  (2001)  suggest  that  litigation  can  potentially  reduce  managers’ 
incentives  to  provide  disclosure,  particularly  of  forward-looking  information.  The  author 
argue that “this is likely to arise if managers believe that the legal system penalizes forecasts 
made  in  good  faith because  it  cannot  effectively  distinguish between  unexpected  forecast 
errors due to chance and those due to deliberate management bias”(Healy et Palepu, 2001, p. 
423). Large firms reduce their corporate disclosure in order to reduce the cost of litigation. 
Finally, the coefficient of the variable EPSVAR is not significant which suggest no evidence 
on the relation between disclosure and performance. 
***Insert Tables 4-5-6 about here*** 
5. Conclusion   
In this paper four new determinants of the level of disclosure are identified using agency 
theory: ownership and control concentration, the existence of double voting share, family 
ownership.  French  firms  seems  to  be  a  suitable  setting  to  test  the  impact  of  minority 
expropriation on disclosure because of the limited academic exploration on the topic and the 
high level of ownership concentration of French firms increasing controlling private benefits. 
Consistent  with  the  predictions  of  agency  theory,  we  find  that  managers  provide  higher 
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context  of  capital  concentration,  controlling  shareholders  retain  information  in  order  to 
expropriate minority shareholders and exploit private benefits. 
Many  studies  show  a  negative  association  between  disclosure  quality  and  ownership 
concentration  in  a  US  context  (Gelb,  2000)  characterized  by  capital  dispersion  and  the 
prevalence of the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. The study of French 
firms allows us to examine the topic of corporate disclosures in a different ownership context 
from that of the US and to focus on the conflict opposing controlling shareholders to non-
controlling shareholders. After controlling for leverage, US listing, performance and size, we 
find  a  negative  association  between  disclosure  quality  and  ownership  and  control 
concentration, and existence of double voting rights. Our results show a positive association 
between family control and disclosure level and are consistent with the result found by Ali, 
Chen et Radhakrishnan (2007) on an American firm sample. 
This study contributes to the disclosure literature by providing evidence on the impact of 
minority  expropriation  on  the  corporate  disclosure  practices.  Our  findings  support  prior 
studies (Gelb, 2000 ; Fan et Wong, 2002 ; Labelle et Schatt, 2005 ; Attig et al., 2006) and 
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Table 1: Sampling procedure  
                 
                 
Companies listed on Paris Stock Exchange on   118 
31 December 2004 and part of SBF 120          
Financial companies        16 
Companies with Missing annual report        10 
Companies with Missing data        8 
Outliers              3 
Final sample           81 
                 
                 
 
Table 2: Variable definitions  
 
Variable  Definition  Measurement 
Dependent 
variable: 
     
DISCL  Disclosure level  The negative absolute value of analyst 
earning forecast standard deviation 
        
Independent 
variables: 
     
HERFI  Herfindhal index measuring 
ownership concentration 
The  squared sum of shares percentages 
VOT1  Large shareholder  Percentage of voting rights held by the 
largest shareholder 
VOT2  Second shareholder  Percentage of voting rights held by the 
second largest shareholder 
FAM  Family ownership  Dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm is 
controlled by a family and 0 otherwise 
DOUBLE  Double voting shares  Dummy variable coded as 1 if there is a 
double voting shares and 0 otherwise 
VA  Separation between property 
and voting rights 
Voting rights divided by the portion of 
shares of the largest shareholder 
LNTA  Size  Log of total assets 
COT  Foreign quotation  Dummy coded as 1 if the firm is listed on 
foreign market and 0 otherwise 
USCOT  US listing  Dummy coded as 1 if the firm is listed on 
US market and 0 otherwise 
DEBT  Leverage  Total liabilities divided by total assets 
CAC40  CAC40 membership  Dummy coded as 1 if the firm forms part 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of continuous variables 
 
Summary statistics are based on a sample of 84 French listed firms included in the SBF120 
index. FAM equals 1 if a large shareholder is a family and 0 otherwise, SO is coded 1 if 
executives benefit from stock option plans and 0 otherwise, COTATION equals 1 if the firm 
is cross listed and 0 otherwise, HERFI is concentration index equals to the sum of the squared 
shares percentages. VOT1 is voting rights of the first large shareholder, VA is the voting right 
of the first shareholder divided by his shares portion, DEBT is the ratio of total debt per total 
assets, SIZE is the log of total assets. 
Descriptive statistics of continuous variables  
 
   Mean 
Standard 
deviation  Median  Maximum  Minimum  25%  75% 
STD  0.325  0.291  0.24  0.02  1.84  0.4  0.13 
HERFI  0.14  0.143  0.088  0.544  0.001  0.02  0.223 
VOT1  0.349  0.23  0.323  0.84  0.018  0.139  0.546 
VOT2  0.087  0.079  0.06  0.38  0  0.036  0.121 
VA1  1.241  0.264  1.21  2.009  0.898  1  1.412 
LNTA  8.241  1.677  8.274  11.712  4.836  6.89  9.632 




Descriptive statistics of categorical variables 
 
 
Variables     Frequency  Percentage  Total 
   Test variables           
DOUB  No double voting rights  120  36.04  333 
   Double voting rights  213  63.96    
FAM  No family control  166  54.43  305 
   Family control  139  45.57    
   Control variables           
EPSVAR  Bad performance  139  42.38  328 
   Good performance  189  57.62    
COT  No cross-listing  221  66.37  333 
   Cross-listing  112  33.63    
USCOT  No US listing   255  77.51  329 
   US listing  74  22.49    
CAC40  No CAC40 membership  218  64.88  336 








































0Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
  HERFI  VOT1  VOT2  DOUB  VA1  FAM  EPSVAR  COT  USCOT  DEBT  LNTA  CAC40 
HERFI  1                       
                          
VOT1  0.9078**  1                     
   0.000                       
VOT2  0.020  -0.021  1                   
   0.726  0.708                     
DOUB  -0.005  0.2112**  0.042  1                 
   0.935  0.000  0.446                   
VA1  -0.2886**  -0.102  0.022  0.6732**  1               
   0.000  0.072  0.693  0.000                 
FAM  0.2657**  0.4276**  0.049  0.4743**  0.2439**  1             
   0.000  0.000  0.391  0.000  0.000               
EPSVAR  0.042  0.012  -0.026  0.001  -0.073  -0.003  1           
   0.459  0.829  0.646  0.992  0.196  0.959             
COT  -0.2480**  -0.2886**  -0.048  -0.2468**  -0.022  -0.3388**  -0.084  1         
   0.000  0.000  0.388  0.000  0.687  0.000  0.129           
USCOT  -0.2137**  -0.2433**  -0.032  -0.2689**  -0.072  -0.2636**  -0.088  0.7086**  1       
   0.000  0.000  0.567  0.000  0.198  0.000  0.115  0.000         
DEBT  -0.009  0.031  -0.1955**  0.007  0.027  0.057  -0.1271*  -0.004  -0.073  1     
   0.874  0.592  0.000  0.898  0.627  0.327  0.021  0.940  0.192       
LNTA  -0.2109**  -0.2530**  -0.1380**  -0.088  0.107  -0.3170**  -0.030  0.5116**  0.3095**  0.2770**  1   
   0.000  0.000  0.013  0.113  0.056  0.000  0.593  0.000  0.000  0.000     
CAC40  -0.2890**  -0.2805**  -0.2047**  -0.059  0.082  -0.1473*  -0.013  0.4294**  0.2921**  0.1714*  0.7446**  1 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.287  0.139  0.010  0.818  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000   









































Table 5: VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) value 
 
Variable  VIF  1/VIF 
VOT1  9.47  0.105611 
HERFI  8.53  0.117252 
SOEPS  5.03  0.198825 
EPSVAR  3.88  0.257653 
DOUB  2.79  0.35866 
VA1  2.36  0.423709 
INVFOR  2.16  0.463311 
SO  2.09  0.479389 
INVFR  1.66  0.60129 
FAM  1.62  0.6162 
LNTA  1.44  0.69273 
USCOT  1.36  0.73756 
VOT2  1.2  0.835558 
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Table 6: Generalized least squared regression
a  
 
STD is the independent variable that measure the opposite of disclosure level (STD=-
DISCL) 
   1A(1)  1A(2)  1A(3) 
HERFI  0.23014  0.21349    
   (0.030)**  (0.061)*    
VOT1        0.11947 
         (0.074)* 
DOUB  0.07778     0.06538 
   (0.016)**     (0.041)** 
VA1     0.07966    
      -0.16    
FAM  -0.09643  -0.07663  -0.0995 
   (0.003)***  (0.015)**  (0.003)*** 
EPSVAR  -0.03833  -0.0328  -0.0378 
   -0.163  -0.245  -0.171 
LNTA  0.03219  0.02991  0.03236 
   (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.001)*** 
USCOT  -0.06231  -0.07347  -0.06727 
   (0.089)*  (0.046)**  (0.065)* 
DEBT  0.2791  0.2944  0.27213 
   (0.008)***  (0.006)***  (0.010)** 
Constante  -0.03314  -0.0717  -0.03289 
   -0.699  -0.502  -0.707 
Number of observations  285  278  285 
Number of companies  81  81  81 
p-values in parentheses          
*, **, *** significant at de 10%, 5% et 1% 
 
The sample is compose of 81 French listed companies included in SBF120 index in the period 2001-
2004.STD measures analyst earning forecast dispersion (we use the standard deviation of the last 
month preceeding the fiscal year end). HERFI measures ownership concentration and eagal the sum of 
the square percentage of the capital held by shareholders. VOT1 measures control concentration, it 
egals  the percentage of voting rights of the major shareholders. FAM mesure family control. VA1 and 
DOUB  measure  the  degree  of  separation  between  voting  and  cash  flow  rights.  VA1  egals  the 
percentage of voting rights to cashflow rights of the first shareholder. 
 au  rapport  du  pourcentage  des  droits de  vote  et le  pourcentage  des  droits  au  capital  du  premier 
actionnaire. DOUB is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm issues double voting rights and 0 otherwise. 
USCOT is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is listed in USA and 0 otherwise. LNTA and DEBT 
measure respectively the firm size and its debt ratio. 
                                                 


























































































Air France-KLM Ciments Français Jcdecaux SA Scor SE AGF-SA Altadis SA Areva CI
Accor Clarins Klepierre SEB SA April Group Camaieu ASF****
AGF SA SA L'Oreal SES SA AXA Pagesjaunes Euro Disney SCA
Air France-KLM CNP Assurances Lafarge Snecma BNP Paribas Renault SA Eurotunnel SA
Air Liquide R Credit Agricole SA Lagardere Groupe Societe Generale CGG Veritas SES SA Groupe Steria SCA
Alcatel SA LVMH Sodexho Alliance Assurances Snecma Hermes International
Alstom SA Eads M6-Metropole TV Soitec Agricole SA Teleperformance Vallourec
Altadis SA Eiffage Parfumeries Sopra Group Euler Hermes TF1  Zodiac SA
Alten Elior Medidep Communication Eurazeo Trigano
Altran Technologies Essilor Int Michelin Stmicroelect Euronext NV Vivendi Inc
April Group Euler Hermes Natixis Suez Klepierre
Arcelor SA Eurazeo Neopost SA Technip Natixis
Areva CI Euro Disney SCA Nexans SA Teleperformance Scor SE
Assystem Euronext NV NRJ Group TF1  Generale
Atos Origin SA Eurotunnel SA Oberthur Card Sys SA Thales SA Rodamco
ASF Faurecia Pagesjaunes Thomson Wendel
AXA Fimalac Pernod-Ricard Total SA
Bacou-Dalloz SA France Telecom Peugeot SA Trigano
Beneteau Gecina Pierre Et Vacances Ubisoft 
BIC International PPR SA Unibail-Rodamco
BNP Paribas Generale De Sante  Publicis Groupe SA Unilog
Bonduelle GFI Informatique Remy Cointreau Valeo SA
Bouygues SA Groupe Danone Renault SA Vallourec
BusinessObjects Groupe Steria SCA Rexel Veolia 
Camaieu Guyenne-Gascogne  Rhodia Vinci SA
Cap Gemini SA Havas SA Rodriguez Group Vivendi Inc
Carbone-Lorraine Hermes International Safran SA Wendel
Carrefour Imerys Saint Gobain Zodiac SA
Casino Guichard-P Ingenico Sanofi-Aventis
CGG Veritas Ipsos Schneider Electric
Total : 16 Total : 10 Total : 8
Total : 84
****1ère cotation en 2001
Total : 118
Sociétés du SBF120 tirées de la base de données Thomson Financial
*Selon "economic sector description" de Thomson financial
** Il s'agit le plus souvent de problème de correspondances avec IBES ticker
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